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1. “Law in literature” and “law as literature”
For decades, a mainstream approach in Law and Literature studies has fo-
cused on researching and documenting the ways in which the legal phenome-
non appears in literature. A twofold question is often asked: How are legal issues 
described and elaborated in literary creations, and, more generally, in art? Can 
we better understand the law through its representation in novels, figurative arts, 
theatre or cinema?
This research perspective concentrates, as we just said, on law “in litera-
ture”. It is an extremely interesting stream of works and has generated countless 
scientific initiatives1. The “law in literature” approach is still very alive, especially 
in some countries. It is also promising, for its potential application to all forms of 
art and to the polymorphic world of media. 
This paper will follow a different path. We will not look for law in literature. 
Rather, we will speak about law, and notably criminal law, “as” literature2. More 
in particular, we will consider criminal statutes, with their offense definitions, “as” 
literature3. “Law as literature” studies usually deal with the narrative and the style 
of judicial decisions or with lawyer’s advocacy4. Considering this prevalent ap-
proach, our perspective, focused on the text of criminal statutes, seems to be 
quite new5. 
In the first part of this article, we will explore how the “offense definition”6, i.e., 
the legal description of the elements of each crime (murder, rape, bribery, theft 
1 The “law in literature” relation has been explored at least since the mid 19th century. See: JCS (1865), 
pp. 194ff.; stePhen (1857), pp. 124ff. For an analysis of this early stage of the studies, FrAnK (2010). Bibliog-
raphy is so large than even attempting a short list is over-ambitious. Milestone works are those of cArDozo 
(1925); Posner (2009); weisBerg (1976); weisBerg (1984); white (1985); white (1989); white (1982); wigMore 
(1907-1908); wigMore (1922-1923). For an overview, see: sAge heinzelMAn (2006). Research on law in liter-
ature is, for example, the prevalent approach adopted in Italy. I’m thinking, among others, of the scientific 
activities carried out at the Catholic University of Milan and at the University of Florence. See: Forti et al. 
(2012), Forti et al. (2014), Forti et al. (2016); as well as: roselli (2018), roselli (2020). It is active an Italian 
Society for Law and Literature: https://www.lawandliterature.org/index.php?channel=HOME-PAGE.
2 The study of law as literature has been the other mainstream approach. See, among the many, BrooKs 
& gewirtz (1996), guYorA & weisBerg (2000); hAnne & weisBerg (2018).
3 Besides statutes, we will also refer to “common law crimes”, focusing on definitions which are elabo-
rated by courts and institutional authors. While common law crimes are the product of a peculiar lawmaking 
process, notoriously different from that of statutes and quite problematic in terms of legality, to our “law as 
literature” ends all offense definitions can be assimilated. 
4 The focus on the literary nature and of the judicial decision is present since the pioneering work of 
cArDoso (1925), pp. 699ff. 
5 This approach is almost unknow in respect to criminal legislation. It is marginal also in other areas of 
the law, see: schencK (2013), pp. 9ff.
6 “Offense definition” is probably the most effective way of naming what, in continental criminal law 
doctrine, is called “Tatbestand”, “tipo penal” or “fattispecie incriminatrice”: these terms make reference to 
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and so on), is inherently a narrative text7. The “offense definition” is contained in a 
text produced by the parliament, or, when permitted by the constitutional frame-
work, by the common law. The function of such definition is to convey a par-
adigm of wrongdoing in order to communicate a schema of a wrong conduct. 
Furthermore, wrongdoing often generates an unjust outcome, a result that can 
be included in the definition too (as “death” in the crime of murder). In continental 
criminal law, the definition of the offense is called, depending on language and 
scientific tradition, “tipo penal”, “fattispecie criminosa”, “Tatbestand”. 
This article will argue that the offense definition, with its narrative text, is a 
sort of “screenplay of evil”. A screenplay that functions as a very effective tool to 
describe what each prohibition is about. This tool is able to communicate nor-
mative messages to a dual audience: ordinary people and adjudicators. Indeed, 
the narrative of the offense definition generates, on the one hand, rules of con-
duct for citizens; on the other hand, rules of adjudication for judges and juries8. 
In the second part of our work, we will focus on the semiotics of the “offense 
definition”, analysing the crisis of its traditional way of dramatizing and commu-
nicating evil. Conceiving and writing the “tipo penal”, the “fattispecie criminosa”, 
the “Tatbestand” has become extremely difficult for contemporary lawmakers. 
We will try to explain the origins of this crisis and discuss future directions of the 
“literary art” of defining crimes: what kind of dramatization of evil will characterize 
the future of Criminal law? 
2. The offense definition as a literary text 
Definitions of offenses consist in descriptions of the elements which char-
acterize each crime. Such definitions are the backbone of the so-called Special 
part of the criminal law. The objective of defining offenses is to describe ana-
lytically forbidden conduct: murder, rape, bribery, theft and so on. This task is 
the type of fact described by the legal provision of a specific crime. Terminological options different from 
“offense definition” have been considered before making our choice in this paper. “Paradigm of the offense” 
or “Type of fact” get probably closer to Tatbestand and to the other expressions. However, since they are 
not commonly used in English legal literature, they would probably result obscure and not immediately 
understandable. 
An “offense definition” usually includes “conduct”, “result”, other modalities of the prohibited transaction, 
and sometimes mens rea elements. I’m aware that “offense definition” does not completely express the 
significance of the mentioned terms, a significance which is indeed extremely rich. See: gArgAni (1997), pp. 
11ff.; hAsseMer (1968); JíMénez De AsúA (1965), pp. 746ff.; Muñoz conDe & gArcíA Arán (2010), pp. 251ff.; 
PAlAzzo (1979), pp. 342ff.; quintero olivAres (2010), pp. 308ff.; vAssAlli (1992), pp. 535ff. 
7 See also, for further references, PAPA (2019), pp. 22ff.
8 For this distinction, see: roBinson (1990), pp. 729ff.; roBinson (1994), pp. 857ff.; roBinson et al. (1996), 
pp. 304ff. See also: DAn-cohen (1984), pp. 625ff.
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usually in the hands of the legislator and, as we mentioned, it is carried out for (at 
least) two purposes: a) to communicate rules of conduct to ordinary people; b) 
to restrict discretion of adjudicators, i.e., judges and juries, telling them what the 
different crimes entail and hence when they are allowed to convict and impose 
punishment9. 
Strangely enough, the offense definition is not usually vehiculated by direct 
imperatives. Criminal law establishes fundamental rules of conduct for all mem-
bers of the society and yet, surprisingly, does not recur to direct imperatives10. 
Rules of conduct are not formulated as instructions. They look very different from 
orders shouted by a ship commander to its crew during a storm. Or from the Ten 
Commandments (“Thou shall not kill”; “Thou shall not commit adultery”; “Thou 
shall not steal”, etc.)11.
Criminal law does not speak, does not “say” what to do and what not to do; 
it rather… “tells”. It orders by telling, or, as we will argue, storytelling. It imposes 
rules of conduct through the depiction, the illustration of what is wrong. Prohibi-
tions and commands are expressed by a narrative, which consists of micro-sto-
ries, kind of “bonsai tales” which render a vision, an iconographic description of 
wrongdoing. This is true both at common law and according to statutory law.
Let’s consider “burglary”: its narrative, according to the common law defi-
nition, tells the story of “someone who’s breaking and entering the house of 
another in the nighttime, with intent to commit a felony therein….”12. The tale 
of larceny tells us of “someone who’s taking and carrying away the property 
belonging to another…”13. 
Statutory storytelling is not different: robbery statutes narrate of “the feloni-
ous taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or 
immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or 
fear”14. Arson is the story of “who sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned… 
any structure, forest land, or property”15. 
It is very important to keep in mind that the “short story” told by the of-
fense definition makes sense if it is read as a whole – if it is considered as one 
9 Offense definitions work as decision rules also in respect to discretion of prosecutors, police officers 
and other law enforcement agencies. 
10 PAPA (2019), pp. 23ff.
11 We have mentioned the “Ten Commandments” following the widespread vulgate according to which 
they would constitute paradigmatic examples of direct and peremptory orders. This is not the theological 
meaning of the Decalogue: indeed, the so called “Commandments” are “ten words” intended to talk to 
each human being and not to direct him/her like a puppet.
12 Cf. PerKins & BoYce (1982), p. 246.
13 Cf. PerKins & BoYce (1982), p. 292.
14 Cf. California Penal Code, Title 8, Ch. 4, sect. 211.
15 Cf. California Penal Code, Title 13, Ch. 1, sect. 452.
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articulated and comprehensive tale. Considered as fragments (i.e., as single, 
isolated, words: “whoever” + “breaks” + “enters” + “the house” + “of another”, 
etc.) the elements of the offense definition do not convey much information. In 
other words: the communicative effect stems from the narrative, from the story 
taken as a whole. It is the entire plot of the story that portrays the relevant image 
of wrongdoing. It is the story globally told – with its plot, its continuous, analogy- 
-based and completed figurative features – that expresses the meaning of what 
the lawmaker wants to prohibit16. 
Like in a novel, in a fairy tale or in a movie, the overall meaning can only 
be understood by reading the whole story. The reader must take a holistic ap-
proach. No accurate message can be received by considering single lines, iso-
lated pages or random photograms. 
3. A prophetic narrative
We have already said that the “offense definition” tells a short story, a kind 
of “bonsai tale”. This story has the capacity of conveying normative messages. 
They are directed both towards citizens, who receive information about the pre-
scribed rules of conduct, and to judges and juries, who are driven to convict and 
punish only under certain conditions. 
Although obvious, it is important to point out that the story contained in the 
“offense definition” does not talk about the past or the present and does not per-
form entertainment purposes. Offense definitions have a prescriptive function, 
which is naturally directed towards the future. Hence, the stories they tell, rather 
than a fable with moralising purposes (like those written by Aesop or Phaedrus) 
have something prophetic. They have the nature of an apocalypse, intended 
in its original etymology, which refers to the unveiling of knowledge, including 
the revelation of future events17. Indeed, the “offense definition” announces to 
citizens and adjudicators that, in the future, something is very likely to happen. 
According to the prophecy, a certain development of human actions will take 
place: someone will steal, taking and carrying away the property belonging to 
another with the intent to deprive him/her permanently of the chattel; someone 
else will kill, intentionally causing the death of a human being, and so on. 
The mentioned apocalypse, the announcement of future events of the men-
tioned kind, works as a warning. “Qua nescitis hora, estote parati”: even if you 
16 PAPA (2019), pp. 26ff.
17 In ancient Greek: ἀποκάλυψις (apokálupsis). The word is composed by the prefix ἀπό (apó) and the 
verb καλύπτω (kálupto: to hide, to cover). Apocalypse literally means “an uncovering” (of knowledge), a 
revelation. 
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don’t know when, be ready!18 When the day comes, when the forecast devel-
opment of human actions takes place, it will be necessary to draw due conse-
quences. It will be necessary to do what needs to be done, i.e., to bring criminal 
charges and, if conviction follows, to punish the perpetrator of the crime by 
imposing on him/her the penalty set out by the law.
4. Imaginal apocalypses 
We said that the offense definition is a sort of apocalypse – a revelation 
about the future. The revelation is also associated with prescriptions concerning 
what should be done when the prophecy will come true: when the day comes, 
it will be appropriate to convict and punish. But what is exactly the nature of this 
apocalypse? To answer this question, we need a closer analysis of the particular 
narrative contained in the offense definition. 
The narrative of the “offense definitions” is indeed a very special one. Its main 
characteristic is that it is capable to produce imaginative thinking. The “bonsai 
tale” narrated by the words of the lawmaker is able to create the mental image 
of a fact19. 
Offense definitions offer very good examples of the rhetorical figure known 
as “hypotyposis”20. Hypotyposis is a communication technique that uses nar-
rative to portrait visual experience, putting the reader in the condition “to see 
through the words”. In the case of the definitions of criminal law, the generated 
image is dynamic. Thanks to the words of the statute, we see a kinetic rep-
resentation of events. The narrative of “offense definitions” succeeds in evoking 
a “dramatic action”, an authentic “cinematographic view” of wrongdoing, a short 
video of evildoing. Here is, for example, a first short film: “Purse snatching”. The 
vision of this variant of theft is projected in our mind by the words, for example, 
of art. 624.2 bis of the Italian Criminal Code, which reads as follows: “ […] who 
gets the possession of another’s chattel, […] taking it from the person that holds 
18 This is obviously a reference to the Gospel of Matthew 24.44: “So you also must be ready. The Son of 
Man will come at a time when you don’t expect him”. ERV translation. 
19 On how mental images can be produced by language, ArnheiM (1969), pp. 226ff.; Mitchell (1994), pp. 
111ff.; wunenBurger (1997), p. 53ff.; thoMAs (2019). 
20 The rhetorical figure called “hypotyposis” has been well known both among ancient rhetoricians (such 
as Cicero and Quintilian) and modern critics. For a definition and references, see: PrAto (2017), pp. 267ff.; 
see also: eco (2014), pp. 77-88. 
Interesting examples of hypotyposis can be found in the early-20th century literary movement called “Imag-
ism”. Imagism favoured precision of imagery and clear, sharp language. The movement included, among 
others, E. Pound, F. S. Flint, T. S. Eliot. I discussed the possible relevance of Imagism for the criminal law 
in PAPA (2019), p. 35 note 19. 
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it, by grabbing it out of another’s hands or ripping it off the person, to obtain a 
profit for himself or others”.
As already noted, it is a very effective narrative, apt to produce a vivid imag-
ination of the fact, so vivid that readers may “see”, in their minds, the animation 
of the prohibited conduct. 
Fig. 1 – Purse snatching: a theft with violent apprehension of the chattel stolen 
(https://www.canstockphoto.es/bandidomujer-de-negocios-calle-10591432.html) 
Similarly, sect. 581 of the Italian penal code refers to the crime of battery, 
defining it as the act of someone “who beats another person”. Here it is the im-
mediate transposition of such narrative into an image:
Fig. 2 – Battery
(http://clipartportal.com/assault-and-batteryclipart/)
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The images above demonstrate that it is quite easy to read the narrative 
of the definition and mentally see the corresponding images of wrongdoing. In 
other words, thanks to its particular way of telling, the “offense definition” can 
produce a mental vision of the wrongful conduct. 
It is important to underline, once again, that the “offense definition” fulfils its 
goals thanks to a double characteristic. On the one hand, the narrative nature of 
the text; on the other hand, the particular style of such narrative, which uses the 
mentioned rhetoric of hypotyposis. It is a narrative that has the ability of creating, 
in the readers’ mind, an imaginative thought.
As we have already said, the “offense definition” creates a kind of Gestalt 
knowledge, a holistic vision of the criminal wrongdoing21. It enables the reader 
to know a “whole”, the prohibited wrongdoing, which is much more than a sum 
of parts. The image of evil that the reader is able to catch is not the addition of 
the several elements of the crime. If we concentrate on single fragments of the 
definition, the sense of the global vision may get lost, preventing us from seeing 
what wrongdoing is really about.
It is important to remember that the possibility of understanding the pro-
hibited conduct as a whole, adopting a Gestalt vision of wrongdoing, does not 
depend only on narrativity, but also on hypotyposis: the capacity to produce 
visions, mental images of what is forbidden. The “bonsai tale” narrated by the of-
fense definition evokes an iconic representation of wrongdoing. Such an amaz-
ing “iconography of evil” is possible if the representation of the prohibited fact 
describes a well-modelled shape of action. A shape whose traits are coherent, 
continuous, visible. Such paradigmatic shapes of wrongdoing trigger the read-
er’s imagination and induce a holistic, Gestalt vision of the prohibition. 
As illustrated extensively in a previous work, the capacity of “offense defini-
tions” to generate an iconography of evil reveals the most authentic meaning of 
the word “special”, the adjective that characterizes the “Special part” of crimi-
nal law22. Indeed, the word “special” comes etymologically from the Latin verb 
“specio/spicio”, which means “to look at”, “to see”23. Therefore, “special” alludes 
to the visual, imaginative and “spectacular” nature of the offense description. 
Thanks to this “specialty”, thanks to the iconographic, cinematographic nature 
of the narrative, citizens and adjudicators can really understand what each crime 
definition refers to. 
21 On the philosophy of Gestalt, see, for all: KAtz (1948).
22 PAPA (2019), pp. 14ff.
23 PAPA (2019), p. 15.
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5. Documentary narrative and fictional narrative
What exactly is depicted by the narrative of the offense definition? How does 
the narrative relate to wrongdoing? Which are the paths and the methods that 
legislators follow to conceive and describe the “dramatic action” represented in 
the film noir of Criminal law?
The topic – as it is understandable – is very complex. However, we can dis-
tinguish two approaches that are rather different and that, from the standpoint of 
semiotics and aesthetic choices, correspond to two different ways of narrating.
On the one hand, there is what we may call a documentary and portraiture 
representation of the relevant action and of the significant outcome. When the 
“offense definition” is inspired by this narrative model, it is basically a mirror, a 
mimesis of recurring aggressive conducts. 
On the other hand, there is a more creative way of narrating, a more fictional 
and artistic way of “rendering” evil. It is an attempt to make the invisible visible 
and to give shape to the kind of wrongfulness that the lawmaker wants to stig-
matize and punish. We can call this approach “artistic” or “fictional” because the 
narration of the fact is the result of a creative effort and, in some way, it takes 
shape thanks to the lawmaker’s creativity. This peculiar “rendering” effort re-
quires a complex reflection about the ways of expressing, depicting, forming and 
dramatizing the “tragic action” – the action which forms the basis of each crime.
When the “offense definition” is inspired by this model, it is very much a 
script about wrongdoing, a screenplay of evil. Most “offense definitions” in con-
temporary criminal statutes are written by using this narrative technique.
5.1. Documentary narrative: The “offense definition” as a mimesis of 
frequent patterns of aggression 
Simplifying a very complex topic, we can define the first manner of narrating 
described above – that is, the documentary, portraiture one – as basically a 
straight, mimetic, photographic, “literal” representation of the relevant fact. The 
relevant fact is, literally, the one represented in the image. 
A good example of this form of narrative is offered by a classic photograph 
of the September 11 attacks at the Twin Towers, the World Trade Center in New 
York: 
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Fig. 3 – September 11, 2001: The attack on the Twin Towers
photo by Robert Clark – Institute 
(https://time.com/3449480/911-the-photographs-that-moved-them-most/)
In criminal law, the said “documentary approach” is of course applied in a 
unique way. Offense definitions cannot picture a single fact, a specific historical 
transaction. It is always necessary, in framing the “relevant offense”, to carry out 
a process of abstraction and typification. However, the lawmaking process can 
be labelled as documentary when the offense definition portraits “paradigmatic 
patterns of wrongdoing”, “visual schemata of evil”, “manifest shapes of aggres-
sive conduct”. 
The “documentary” approach, with its literal vision of patterns of manifest 
wrongdoing, was very popular in the ancient criminal law. For instance, as we will 
see later on, the approach was adopted in describing “the mother of all property 
offenses”, the crime of larceny. Extremely documentary is, within the law of larceny, 
the crime of manifest larceny (furtum manifestum) present in the Bible and in Ro-
man law, more specifically in the XII Tables24. Even today, many offenses belonging 
to the most traditional core part of criminal law are inspired by this approach. 
The documentary approach is characterized by a strong figurative formalism, 
by a vivid iconicity in the description25. In its celebrated works, George Fletcher 
says that this approach reveals one of the fundamental patterns of criminal lia-
bility: “the pattern of manifest criminality”26. The documentary approach focuses 
on very specific “modalities of action”. Hence it can be also described as “ritual- 
istic”. This type of criminal law seems indeed very close to ancient culture, which 
24 See: Fletcher (1976), pp. 469ff.; Fletcher (1978), pp. 115ff. 
25 PAPA (2019), pp. 59ff.
26 Fletcher (1976), pp. 469ff.; Fletcher (1978), pp. 115ff.
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elaborated rules of purity, as well as ritual prescriptions concerning sex, hygiene 
and health. 
As already mentioned, an example of documentary offense definition is rep-
resented by the figure of furtum manifestum provided by ancient Roman law. 
In the case of furtum manifestum, the narration of the prohibition, and of its 
consequences reflects, very iconically, a precise trance de vie. It is night-time: a 
thief enters another person’s home. His hands are already on the goods to be 
stolen, but he is caught by the householder just in the act of stealing. Here is an 
extremely evident icon of wrongdoing, a clear pattern of manifest criminality. So 
clear that it allows the householder, the dominus (the owner of the home, of the 
domus) to kill the thief on the spot. 
Still today, the crime of larceny is often described according to a similar nar-
rative and follows a documentary drafting model. Still today, the representation 
of the criminal wrongdoing is highly mimetic, visual, and, in some way, “literal”. It 
represents a perpetrator who enters into another person’s area of spatial control, 
takes a chattel, and carries it away into an area of own control – and this is the 
“taking of possession”. The paradigm of a thievery aggression has its own con-
stant, recurring and manifestly wrongful form.
Fig. 4 – The paradigm of larceny
[image drawn from Rodriguez (2010)] 
Examples of documentary, manifest criminality can be found not only in 
other forms of larceny such as “purse snatching” and more in general larcenies 
committed with the use of some form of violence (see Fig. 1 above), but also 
in respect to crimes as battery (see Fig. 2 above), robbery, causing personal 
injuries, criminal damage, rape (according to the old legal schema based on 
sexual penetration by violence or threat), arson, burglary and other traditional 
crimes. 
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It is interesting to note how traditional paradigms of wrongdoing, character-
ized, as already said, by the evident criminality of the conduct, are born and take 
shape firstly in shared opinions of the community. In these cases, the legislator 
does not have to create any shape of the crime, since it is possible to receive 
such a shape from shared social opinions. The form of wrongdoing, its iconogra-
phy, has already been created by the community. In conclusion, there is little plot 
to conceive and little script to write: like a National Geographic documentary, like 
a film crew on mission in the park of Serengeti, the legislator builds the narration 
by simply film shooting what is in plain view. 
5.2. Fictional narrativity: the offense definition as a screenplay of evil
The time when the offense definition, the definition of criminal wrongdoing, 
was mimesis, i.e., a documentary representation of aggressive conducts and 
dangerous events, did not last long. After all, an effective criminal law system 
cannot be reduced to a simple translation of existing social conceptions of 
wrongdoing into law. No complex society can hope to find, already crafted in 
society, all relevant schemata of wrongdoing. Patterns of conduct capable of 
expressing a manifest, univocal, and conclusive meaning of criminality pattern 
are quite few and do not evolve as rapidly as the need of crime control. 
Having said that, is not difficult to understand why it became necessary to 
move on to the second narrative technique, the fictional one. 
In many contexts in which it is impossible to receive a paradigmatic, iconic 
figuration of wrongdoing directly from society, the legislator must conceive and 
define it by its own words. This is a complex work, which requires a creative 
reflection similar to the one of a novelist or a painter who, for example, wants to 
represent a holy subject; or a film director, who, together with his screenwriter, 
wants to give shape to a story. The writer wonders: how can I tell the story of a 
“marriage that cannot happen” (“un matrimonio che non s’ha da fare”), in Lom-
bardy, in the 1600s27? The painter wonders: which figuration should be given to 
religious events such as “The Rising of Lazarus” or “The transportation of Mary’s 
House from Nazareth to Loreto”28? The film director speculates: How can I tell 
27 Reference is to the Italian historical novel “I promessi sposi” (The Betrothed) by Alessandro Manzoni, 
published in its final version between 1840 and 1842. Manzoni’s I promessi sposi is the most famous and 
widely read novel in the Italian language. The story starts when a local baron of 17th-century Lombardy 
unjustly tries to stop the marriage between Renzo, a young silk-weaver of humble origins, and Lucia. 
28 Reference is here to a celebrated religious theme, depicted, among others, by Caravaggio (La Madon-
na dei Pellegrini, 1604-1606) and by Annibale Carracci (La Traslazione della Santa casa di Loreto, 1605). 
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the story of a mediocre boxer, named Rocky, who starting from a squalid urban 
gym manages to become the world champion29?
Returning to criminal law: how should the legislator write the offense defini-
tion concerning misappropriation (embezzlement) or fraud? This is not an easy 
task. The documentary approach, adopted for furtum manifestum (where the 
legislator could receive the form of the relevant conduct directly from the com-
munity), cannot be applied. Indeed, the aggression to the protected legal interest 
is not embedded in a precise and visible form of conduct. Let’s consider mis-
appropriation/embezzlement: in these offenses, the wrongfulness derives from 
the conflict between who has a lawful possession of the chattel and the owner 
of such property. Since the former already has possession, the breach of the 
owner’s rights does not require the taking of the property. The aggression starts 
when the holder performs acts implying the unlawful disposal of rights, i.e., acts 
not allowed by the title on which his/her possession is founded and that are 
incompatible with the rights of the owner. The criminality of these acts is usually 
invisible, since, from the point of view of an external observer, they look exactly 
as lawful acts. 
If this is true, how should the new crime be drafted? How should wrongful-
ness be represented? When it is impossible to use paradigms that are imitative 
of recurring patterns of aggression, it is necessary to elaborate a creative and 
fictional figuration of evil/wrongdoing.
Called to conceive and define such figuration, the lawmaker has to forge the 
shape of the relevant conduct, elaborating, creatively and artistically, a “typified 
image” of its manifestation. Once the legislator enters the field of artistic creation, 
the aesthetic preferences and the stylistic vision adopted become more and 
more important. We can consider these preferences and vision as a “poetics”, 
i.e., a theory of literary forms, a structured set of expressive intents.
6. Developing a “poetics”: the need of an aesthetic theory to 
write offense definitions
Conceiving and then fictionally describing the “offense definition” are part of 
a writing process that, as often in aesthetics, depends, as we said, on a poetics. 
It depends on an aesthetic theory of literary forms, on a structured set of expres-
sive intents, on a body of stylistic options. Exactly as in the work of an artist. The 
artist is, in our case, the lawmaker, the legislator. 
29 Reference is to the movie “Rocky”, the celebrated 1976 American sports drama film directed by John 
G. Avildsen, written by and starring Sylvester Stallone.
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A poetics, as a theory of literary form, pertains to the field of aesthetics, but 
it obviously includes axiological connotations. For example, the poetics of “re-
alism” or that of “symbolism” have their different moral or political implications. 
To our purposes, it is relevant to note that after the demise of the “documen-
tary” approach in lawmaking, good legal drafting requires, inevitably, a sophisti-
cated and coherent poetics, a sound theory of literary forms.
7. The development of the narrative style: events, symbols and 
subjective insight 
One of the key points in the process that leads from the “documentary of-
fense definition” towards the “fictionalized” one is undoubtedly the enhance-
ment, the valorisation of one or more “events”, outcomes resulting from the 
wrongful conduct (such as “death” in murder). Events characterize the story 
narrated in the offense definition and give dynamism and salience to the tale. 
Through the description of the relevant outcome, the “event”, it is possible 
to develop the idea that crime consists not only in wrongful actions or omissions 
but also in a conduct that is harmful. Harmful because of its consequences30. 
Thus, something of great aesthetic value stems from the event: the outcome 
highlights the aggression to the protected interest, to the so-called “legal good”. 
The event highlights “the gist of the story” told by the offense definition. The 
development of the idea of “legal good” (life, physical integrity, property, ad-
ministration of justice, sexual autonomy) is a real turning point in the evolution 
of criminal law poetics. That of the legal good is a conceptual category apt to 
catch the essence of the offense. Regardless of the kind of action performed by 
the perpetrator, what counts is the outcome, i.e., the production of a harm to 
the protected legal good. Crime is no longer the violation of a rule of rituality. It 
consists in the harm of a legally protected interest.
This turning point allows the legislator to break free from the literalness of 
typical forms (those of furtum manifestum for example) and to move on towards 
a different “construction” of the wrongful act. 
Another good example is offered by the offense definition of fraud. Fraud is 
often “invisible”. Besides cases in which a false instrument is used to deceive, 
fraud can take a million different forms. Hence, the definition has to deal with a 
crime which can rarely be associated with a constant, recurrent, visible shape 
of wrongdoing. 
30 Harmful consequences are the fundamental feature of a pattern of liability different from that of “man-
ifest criminality” typical of larceny, Fletcher (1978), pp. 235ff.
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In order to overcome these problems, in many criminal justice systems, 
legislators prefer to define by focusing on the fraudulent causation of a series 
of outcomes (deception of the victim, conveyance of property, damage, unjust 
profit). Fraud is defined as the breach of the victim’s right to self-determination 
with economically relevant consequences. 
While the construction of the offense definition goes beyond the pattern 
of manifest criminality, it inevitably ends up resorting to conceptual, technical 
and esoteric notions (like “conveyance”, but also “damage”, “profit” and “other 
person’s ownership”), which, in their turn, refer to further technical notions that 
specify their content. The legal environment becomes more and more cryptical 
and a decryption key, usually in the hands of lawyers, becomes necessary. Like 
conceptual art, criminal law moves away from the sensitivity and from the cogni-
tive capacity of ordinary people. 
What we described until now mainly concerns the definition of wrongdoing, 
of the actus reus. If we turn to the mens rea, to the subjective aspect of the 
crime, we see an increasing interest of legislators for this side of the narrative.31 
Criminal law becomes a psychological novel. However, if the offense definition 
includes subjectively qualifying elements or if the agent’s specific intent is even 
the very reason for criminalization, the task of the legislator becomes increasingly 
complicated, given the difficulty of describing the subjective features of the nar-
rated fact in an iconographic way.
8. Homelands without prophets: the crisis of the offense 
definition in contemporary criminal justice systems 
In the last few decades, the complicated task of writing a “screenplay of the 
evil” has become an increasingly challenging one. Rendering evil has become 
incredibly difficult for the legislator. Challenges that are associated with the task 
of dramatizing wrongdoing have been greatly exacerbated in recent decades. 
Even the “scripted”, fictionalized, approach – and not only the documentary one, 
the one based on the mimesis of the recurring event – is in deep crisis. 
Lawmakers seem to have exhausted all prophetic capacity. They no longer 
are able to make an analytical forecast about the types of wrongdoing that will 
happen. They no longer have creative wisdom, visionary sensitivity, expressive 
resources. Legislators no longer have a “poetics”, an aesthetic theory capable 
of elaborating the imaginary apocalypse of future scenarios. This is clear when 
we think of digital, immaterial new crimes that might emerge with the advance 
of technology.
31 Fletcher (1978), pp. 118ff.
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There are many reasons for the crisis. In extreme synthesis, we can say that 
the ability to conceive and write offense definitions became problematic because 
the possibility of ordering the world according to the appearance of things be-
came problematic too. It is more and more difficult, for the legislator, to describe 
(and, therefore, “prophesy”) wrongdoing by identifying the paradigmatic modali-
ties of its realization, modalities endowed with a constant form, with a clear icon 
of the typical fact. 
The semiotic context in which the contemporary legislator operates is very 
different from the past. When it comes to conceiving and describing the typical 
conduct, when it comes to defining the typical criminally relevant fact, legislators 
are faced with a reality context whose forms are ambiguous, polysemic, elusive. 
Let us think of the definition of new crimes such as tax fraud, insider trading, 
self-money laundering, stalking; or of the many offenses provided for by the 
economic regulations. What is their visible face, what is the morphologically sig-
nificant form of these crimes? 
To the protean and polysemic mutation of the aspect of things we should add 
(and we see it daily) the process of progressive dematerialization and de-contex-
tualization of the reality with which we interact. All this has an enormous impact 
on the social, economic and legal context in which we live. Planetary globali-
zation, the development of information technology and virtual worlds, the, now 
permanent, migration of our minds to the web: everything goes in the direction 
of overcoming materiality. In the past, aggressions to property had to be neces-
sarily carried out through intrusive conduct, i.e., conduct penetrating the sphere 
of the physical domain of others. By contrast, today, “just a click” is enough. One 
click on the keyboard of a computer or smartphone is all that it takes to illegally 
move millions of euros or dollars. 
In addition to the difficulties of conceiving and describing visible, significant, 
shapes of conduct in an increasingly dematerialized world, there are also difficul-
ties due to the multiplication of legal interests worthy of protection but in conflict 
with each other; interests that must therefore be balanced in concrete terms. 
The growing proliferation of deserving and conflicting interests makes it impos-
sible to balance them “once and for all” and to write a well sculptured offense 
definition. With reference to the environment, for example, how can we balance 
“once and for all” the interests of businesses, the right of free enterprise, the right 
to employment, health protection, landscape protection, ecosystem protection, 
etc.? The balance has to be drawn in concrete terms, evaluating each specific 
setting. 
Often, the only way to find an acceptable balance is to refer to a regula-
tion, to the setting of a procedure to manage the issues, a procedure operat-
ed through administrative legislation, by-laws and case by case evaluation. It 
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is necessary to refer to a set of regulatory provisions capable of managing and 
balancing such interests: identifying, weighting, modulating, ordering them in a 
certain relationship. In other words, an otherwise unmanageable conflict can be 
handled by providing, outside of the criminal law, a regulation capable of bal-
ancing, in concrete terms, the various interests at stake – thus finding, precisely 
through a procedure, and often with the involvement of stakeholders, the difficult 
balance between the conflicting assets. Criminal law may re-enter the game by 
working as an instrument that sanctions the violations of the said administrative 
procedure. 
9. End of visual criminal law?
Our reflection begs the question – is some form of iconographic and cine-
matographic figuration in the description of the criminal offense still possible? Is 
it still possible to “order reality according to its appearance”? Can the descriptive 
trait of legislative prose still, despite the demands of modernity, be continuous, 
pictorial, analogical? 
Figurative art shows that the use of the forms of perceptible reality can be 
taken to its extreme limits. The art of the twentieth century has given full evi-
dence of this, just think of Cubism. For example, we can refer to the use of the 
forms of nature made by Pablo Picasso in “Guernica”:
Fig. 5 – Pablo Picasso: Guernica (1937) 
Despite the great innovative character of Picasso’s narrative method, the painting  
still represents forms and figures drawn from reality
Considering criminal law now: is it possible to collect morphological frag-
ments of reality, assemble them according to new compositional methods and 
ensure that the overall picture still has a prescriptive meaning?
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I doubt that this approach will work in criminal law. In criminal law, a Guerni-
ca-like aesthetic approach, aimed at maintaining the forms of perceptible reality 
at all costs, has very little chances of succeeding. Indeed, as we have repeated 
several times, in criminal law what must be capable of being figured is the entire-
ty of the offense, the Gestalt form wrongdoing. Picking single fragments of reality 
and putting them together into a definition does not describe a crime. 
10. Avant-garde criminal law cinema
What, then, is the future for the screenplay of evil in criminal law? 
In dealing with this question recently, we have suggested some possible 
scenarios32. 
We summarize here the terms of an articulated discourse and imagine three 
possible evolutionary directions of the incriminating case. 
10.1. Films without light: the disappearance of reality from the of-
fense definition. 
A first path is presented in clear discontinuity with the centuries-old history 
of the offense definition. It functions through a realistic acknowledgement of the 
epilogue of the iconographic, visual, criminal law parable. From this awareness, 
the path towards a different way of conceiving and describing the assumptions, 
the conditions, of criminal responsibility can start. Those who take this path have 
an awareness: that the world can no longer be ordered according to the appear-
ance of things. What an event looks like is no longer significant. Also in criminal 
law, we must recognize that it has become impossible to retrace an isomorphy, 
an analogy of forms, between aggressive conducts that realize a certain kind of 
unjust; it is difficult to reduce them to unity, to group them according to how they 
appear morphologically. 
The type of aggressive conduct with which we are confronted today (such 
as organized crime, terrorism, economic crimes, tax crimes, etc.) no longer has 
a unity of place, nor of time, nor of action. There is no longer the light of an 
iconography.
One option is to move towards an “iconoclastic” solution: no screenplay 
makes sense anymore. Offense definitions cannot refer anymore to visual reality. 
32 PAPA (2019), pp. 237ff.
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Criminal law becomes a film without light. When defining the requirements of 
responsibility, it is inevitable to give up any references to perceptible reality and 
pay more attention to the purely linguistic dimension of the incriminating norms. 
The aim, however, is not to improve the ability to produce, with words, men-
tal images of forbidden facts. Rather, the perspective is that of enhancing the 
ability of words (and especially some words) to communicate their message with 
“digital” precision.
Therefore, leaving aside any reference to the visible form of a fact and reduc-
ing it to a list of conditions of responsibility, the language of criminal law could 
also be communicated with the digital precision of a bar code or a QR Code. 
The technical nature of the various notions used (think of the qualification of 
“entrepreneur”, i.e., the definition of “invoice” or “insolvency”) allows them to be 
formalized. The new offense definitions will no longer mirror reality, will no longer 
be “facts-species”. They will simply indicate a list of “conditions of responsibility”. 
They could possibly appear like this:
Figs. 6-7 – Bar code and QR code 
Alongside the perspective which tends towards a technical-cryptical formal-
ism, it is possible to see another variant of the “film without light” approach to 
definition. This variant also ignores the shapes of the sensitive world. We can 
name it “informal”. As such, it finds interesting correspondence in the art of the 
twentieth century. 
In the “informal” approach to offense definition, the rejection of the figuration 
goes to the extreme, rejecting any ordered form, even the abstract and ge-
ometric ones. The “informal” offense definition is characterized by mere plastic 
elements: it offers “matter” ready to be received and modelled by the interpreter 
and especially by the courts. 
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Fig. 8 – An emblematic example of informal art: Jackson Pollock: Convergence, 1952
Instances of this legal drafting approach can be found almost in every crim-
inal justice system. Some of the kind are codified in Italian criminal law. Good 
examples are the crimes labelled “Collapse of buildings and other nameless Dis-
asters” (art. 434.2. Italian penal code), “Plagiarism” (former art. 603, Italian penal 
code), “Dangerous Jet of Things” (art. 674, Italian penal code). These statutes 
present such an informal “normative matter” to make possible all kind of plastic 
manipulation. The crime of “Collapse of buildings and other Nameless Disaster” 
has been applied, under the heading of the “Nameless Disaster”, to causing 
personal injuries as a consequence of asbestos production. The crime of “Dan-
gerous Jet of Things” has been extended, by courts interpretation, so to include 
the launch of “things” like radio waves or unpleasant smells33. 
10.2. Animation movies: the “poetics” of offense definition renovated 
by artificial intelligence and augmented reality. 
Renovation of the poetics concerning the drafting of offense definition should 
seek new ways to make the invisible visible: new ways of shaping a shapeless 
entity such as evil/wrongfulness. The following questions unveil a second evolu-
tionary perspective, which is not necessarily alternative to the one we just talked 
about, as the choice could depend on the subject-matter. 
33 References in PAPA (2019), pp. 124ff.
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Is it possible to overcome the present crisis of the offense definition through 
the resources of artificial intelligence? Is it possible to design a new semiotic 
instrument capable of describing wrongdoing in a more modern and effective 
way, for example, through the resources of the so-called “augmented reality”34? 
We know that augmented reality can be used to monitor situations and 
places (e.g., airports and railway stations) or to reconstruct, at trial, a realistic 
view of the facts under discussion. Well, in addition to this, can we think of using 
augmented reality to renovate the poetics of offense definition? Is it possible to 
conceive a semiotic instrument capable of defining new, “enriched”, paradigms 
of wrongdoing? 
It is not easy to answer such questions, which are connected to the most 
advanced frontiers of artificial intelligence: those of computer vision and com-
puter image recognition. These issues cannot be explored in depth here, but 
it could be interesting to note that one possibility is using augmented reality to 
describe some paradigmatic situations, some patterns of conduct that artificial 
intelligence can recognize when they are realized. This scenario constitutes, to 
a certain extent, the development of practices that have now been known for 
a long time, such as the use of cameras to detect those who exceed speed 
limits or cross an intersection with a red light. This approach is also connected 
to new scenarios such as that of self-driving cars: self-driving presupposes the 
automated recognition of typical images and relevant situations35. We know that 
artificial intelligence programs know and recognize, through various sensors and 
thanks to sophisticated software, patterns of situations and types of behaviours 
which are much more complex than crossing a red light or speeding.
Can we think of a scenario in which augmented reality intelligence can elab-
orate paradigmatic situations, being instructed about typical patterns of illegal 
behaviour and the possibility to recognize them when they occur? Can artificial 
intelligence, appropriately guided by an augmented vision, identify and evaluate 
deontologically a list of significant situations? 
Probably, yes. In this regard, the “Moral machine” project, conceived and 
launched by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) in Boston, is very 
interesting and is intended to guide artificial intelligence programs in the per-
ception and solution of ethical dilemmas36. For example, dilemmas concerning 
the choice of the person to sacrifice if, in road traffic, the driver has to make 
a tragic choice (a modern variant of “the trolley problem”). In view of a possi-
ble accident, should the driver/passenger be saved or the passing pedestrian? 
When considering possible victims, is it better to save a small child or a group 
34 See, for all: BArFielD & Blitz (2018).
35 BecK (2017), pp. 227ff.
36 See: http://moralmachine.mit.edu/.
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of elderly people? The Moral machine, which can be consulted interactively on 
the web, poses numerous ethical dilemmas and aims to collect, on a planetary 
level, the opinion of millions of people on the morally preferable choices, so that 
artificial intelligence programs can be educated accordingly. How to program, for 
example, the “right” decision in the case of an ethical dilemma such as the one 
presented in the “vision” below?
Fig. 9 – Moral Machine MIT autonomous car crash game 
(http://moralmachine.mit.edu/) 
Interesting perspectives. We must surely look at all of this with an open 
mind, but also using due caution. Undoubtedly, augmented reality technologies, 
and more generally all forms of artificial intelligence, favour new interactions be-
tween the mind (both human and artificial) and the morphology of the perceiv-
able world. The “Internet of things”, the global connection of things-sensors, 
enable us to insert, in the augmented representation of the world, information 
that natural morphology will not be able to express directly. All minds can take 
advantage from such an amazing enrichment and concentration of the infor-
mation available on the screen view. Artificial intelligence, interacting with the 
environment through various types of sensors and combining a great deal of 
information, is able to give a vision of the world that is omniscient, albeit within 
the limits of human knowledge. This kind of new cognitive and descriptive sy-
naesthesia will certainly influence the way in which normativity will be structured 
in forthcoming years. 
Despite these promising features, I remain quite sceptical about the pos-
sibility that augmented reality and artificial intelligence will be able to provide 
satisfying solutions to the problem of offense definition. Indeed, artificial intelli-
gence, even if advanced and sophisticated, is not really able to “understand the 
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world” as a sequence of concrete unprecedented events. Artificial intelligence is 
not capable “to live”, to experience life factuality as a unique and unrepeatable 
phenomenon. 
Artificial intelligence codifies and manages its interaction with the world ac-
cording to algorithms. When facing historical happenings, it detects and ap-
praises the relevance of a fact only in terms indicated by a quantitative model, 
by an algorithm. The recognition of the relevant fact takes place under standard 
parameters, which are always previously set. No matter how sophisticated and 
intelligent the informatics system is, and even if it can evolve and learn very 
rapidly, we can proverbially say that, like Achilles, it will never reach the turtle. 
In the field of law, artificial intelligence will never be able to reach, to live in the 
present. It will always interpret historical happenings depending on a mechanism 
of reminiscence. 
I will try to better explain this point. Traditional offense definitions deal with 
future happenings. We spoke about apocalypses and prophecies. However, 
when the future forecast by the definition comes true as “present”, it is a judge, 
a human being, who has to draw due consequences. With his/her human mind, 
the judge has to select and evalutate the relevant facts, interactively combining 
them with the law. From this combination, something new occurs: a judicial de-
cision is born. This decision is not totally implied by law, nor was hidden, already 
packaged, in the facts of the case. Human decisions that apply the law are never 
tautological. They are always the outcome of “a fertile intercourse” between the 
interpreter and the case under evaluation. 
Artificial intelligence proceeds in a different way. If a factual paradigm (such 
as an offense definition) is formalized and stored in an algorithm, the software will 
use it as a something to recognize. It is a reminiscence. The case is very different 
from the one of a human being that appraises a fact “in the present”, identify-
ing and interpreting such a fact in the unique and unrepeatable moment of the 
decision. The algorithm does not live, does not experience the unprecedented 
mystery of the present time, the unfathomable unicity of each moment of life. 
For artificial intelligence, the historical happenings, the present, is always a 
past time that comes true. The present is a set of conditions foreseen by the 
quantitative model stored in its memory. For artificial intelligence, history is not 
a sequence of unique, never-seen-before facts, but only a set of predetermined 
stimuli that the algorithm is able to identify, to recognize and to process in light of 
its stored data and its instructions. I previously said that this is a “reminiscence” 
process. When used by artificial intelligence, the offense definition turns from a 
prophecy concerning the future into a cluster of memory, stored in the artificial 
mind and mechanically retrieved when instructed to do so. 
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10.3. Fantastic cinema: the offense definition as a metaphor of the 
evil 
Given the uncertain scenarios offered by the previously illustrated options, it 
is probably wise to seek other paths. 
I think that one fruitful research path may be directed towards a deeper 
knowledge of the nexus between law and metaphors37. In particular, and this is 
really a new perspective, towards a closer analysis of the relationship that exists 
between the pattern, the image of evil/wrongdoing depicted in the definition and 
the evil, the wrongfulness, behind it38. 
We have repeated several times that offense definitions are drafted as 
screenplays of evil. If this is true, the capacity to elaborate screenplays of evil, 
to dramatize wrongdoing, could be enhanced by developing prohibitions which 
are iconic metaphors of evil, metaphors of wrongfulness. In other words, the 
relationship between the offense definition, and the evil behind it, should be 
better detected and described as a metaphorical relationship. We know that 
metaphors can work here as bridges from the species (the conduct described in 
the offense definition) and the genus (the evil, the wrongfulness behind). Indeed, 
the species is able to make the genus, i.e., the evil which is the basis of criminali-
zation, concrete and visible. Writing an offense definition is a way of visualizing, 
of showing in clear and definite forms the impalpable and shapeless entity which 
stands behind the prohibition: the evil, the wrongful, the unjust. The species, i.e., 
the conduct described in the offense definition, acts as a cognitive bridge. It is 
a bridge towards the genus: the evil, the wrongful, the unjust. The species, as a 
metaphor, puts the genus “under the eyes” of the reader. 
The metaphorical connection that exists between species and genus is 
known since ancient philosophy39. Aristotle discusses it extensively, recalling the 
example of the “ten thousand enterprises of Odysseus”, where “ten thousand” 
(the species) stands for a generic “many” (the genus). “Ten thousand” brings 
before the eyes of the reader what the word “many” cannot express, because of 
its level of abstraction40. 
In light of this – how can criminal law identify, the species (i.e., the conduct 
to be described in the offense definition) capable of effectively rendering, of con-
cretely expressing, through metaphorical figuration, the essence of the genus, 
i.e., the essence of the evil, of the wrongful, of the unjust? How can we conceive 
37 See, among others: hAnne & weisBerg (2018); lAKoFF & Johnson (1980); wAlton (1990); AA.VV. (2016); 
winter (2001).
38 PAPA (2019), 111ff.
39 See, for example: eco (1984), pp. 164ff.; Eco (2007), pp. 67ff., 115ff.; ricoeur (1975).
40 Aristotle (334-330 B.C.), 21, 1457b 5-10.
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and describe offense definitions capable of representing evil metaphorically, alle-
gorically and hence in visible, empirically verifiable form? 
We believe that an essential (a fundamental) part of future reflection on 
offense definition should focus on the metaphorical relationship between the 
species described and the genus behind it. A new “poetics” can be based on 
metaphors and allegories. Of course, it will be necessary to understand better 
the mentioned relation and to become capable of mastering the “evocative” 
capacity of metaphors, their ability to link a visible form of wrongdoing to the 
invisible evil behind it. 
This phenomenon is well known, since it is very evident in those metaphors 
named “metaphors by analogy”. Romeo speaks about Juliet and calls her “the 
sun” of his life. This is a metaphor by analogy. People talk about old age as “the 
sunset of life”. One cannot say exactly what love is and what old age is, they 
are abstract and invisible entities. But we are all able to express both notions by 
using metaphors. 
It is time to give an example. In the effort to criminalize “mafia”, the Italian leg-
islator knew that mafia is an elusive and hard to grasp notion. What is the mafia? 
The related socio-criminological literature is extensive. In the face of such elusive 
notion, the ad hoc statute, enacted in 1982, chose to define mafia trying to make 
the invisible visible. The invisible genus, the notion of mafia, was grasped with 
a metaphor describing a species. According to art. 416 bis of the Italian penal 
code, mafia is the association in which “those who are part of it use the force of 
intimidation of the associative bond and the conditions of subjugation and the 
resulting conspiracy of silence to commit crimes, to acquire the management or 
control of economic activities, to make an unfair profit or advantage […]’.
We are faced here with a visual species of an invisible genus. The offense 
definition is the result of a “metaphorical rendering “ of the invisible. The words 
of the definition try to express that indefinite and elusive concept of mafia, a 
concept that social sciences still need to articulate, with concrete and specific 
references. The invisible was made visible through a metaphorical creation.
11. A conclusion
As we have discussed earlier, the images of evil depicted in the offense 
definitions can no longer be modelled as mimetic representations of physical 
reality – a reality that, today, is more and more difficult to order according to its 
appearance. 
As we have seen, when searching a new poetics for offense definition, one 
possibility is to frame crime paradigms by getting rid of all reference to perceptible 
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reality. Bar or QR codes can take the place of elaborated fact-related descrip-
tions. However, as we saw, wiping out tangible reality from criminal statutes is 
highly controversial. Another option is building on the resources of new technol-
ogies, such as artificial intelligence or augmented reality. As an alternative, legal 
drafting can develop more “informal” ways of depicting the prohibition, as in the 
mentioned case of the Italian crime of “Dangerous Jet of Things”. We discussed 
these possible evolution paths, but none of these seems to be satisfactory.
Having exhausted the poetics of documentary narration, having exhausted 
the expressive resources of the subsequent neo-realist fictional approach, will 
we find in metaphorical creativity – and therefore in allegorical, imaginative, sym-
bolist poetics – the way to keep the criminal law connected to the way things 
look? If so, what kind of artistic reference can criminal lawyers, and legislators, 
have in their search? What kind of aesthetics can help renovation of the poetics 
of offense definition? 
Art has been able, throughout the 20th century, to overcome the increasing 
difficulties in dealing with a more and more protean reality: James Joyce, Arnold 
Schönberg, Pablo Picasso were, together with others, the pioneers of the new 
explorations. They managed to express, with their innovative art, the dramatic 
changes which affected, since the beginning of the last century, the relation be-
tween the human mind and the world. 
For the renovation of criminal law, should we follow a similar aesthetic 
reference?
I do not think so. While rethinking the poetics of offense definitions, the aes-
thetic reference to be followed can hardly be something like Picasso’s “Guerni-
ca”. It is not that expressive twisting of perceivable reality which can guide the 
renovation of our law. Offense definition should always maintain the capacity to 
establish rules of conduct and rules of adjudication. They cannot portray a dis-
torted reality. They have a fundamental role in protecting the individual against 
the power of the public authority. 
What else then? 
In a recent book, I referred to the figurative art of sacred icons, the reli-
gious paintings or mosaics, developed, since the 7th century, in the culture of 
the eastern Christian religions (mainly inside the Orthodox Church)41. Sacred 
icons are said to be “images of the invisible”42. They are not, in the strict sense, 
“representations” of persons of objects, but symbolic “doors”, “gates” capable 
of connecting the Human being with the spiritual essence of God. 
41 PAPA (2019), pp. 121ff. 
42 See: evDoKìMov (1972), pp. 169ff.; seDler (1981), pp. 75ff.
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Maybe, the figurative art that could better inspire the necessary renovation 
of criminal law is just the art of the sacred icons. Offense definitions could be 
designed to perform a similar cognitive function. As icons, offense definitions 
should rely more on symbolic communication and less on literal, photographic, 
representation of wrongdoing. 
Forging effective and illuminating metaphors may be a good way to walk 
this path. Metaphors, as we said, have the ability of “putting before the eyes” 
of readers the visible images of the invisible. In the case of criminal law, met-
aphors should be able to put before the eyes of citizens and adjudicators the 
visible images of evil, the recognizable images of wrongfulness. Playing the 
same cognitive role as sacred icons, metaphors should function as a “star-
gate” to the shapeless kingdom of the invisible – which in the case of criminal 
law is the kingdom of evil, the kingdom of the wrongfulness that we want to 
counter.
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